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This paper studies the effects of deposit insurance on bank behavior using individual
bank data from Kansas in the 1920s. Kansas banks were severely stressed by the collapse of
agricultural prices in 1920 and resulting increase in farm mortgage defaults. Because
membership in the state deposit insurance system was voluntary, it is possible to compare the
behavior of insured and non-insured banks facing similar exogenous circumstances. We find
that deposit insurance encouraged excessive risk-taking, which helps to explain the
comparativelyhigh failure rate of insured banks. The deposit insurance fund ultimately failed
to reimburse many depositors offailed banks. We find, however, no evidence of a decline in
the credibility ofinsurance, and hence in the ability of insured banks to take excessive risks,
before the system’s collapse in 1926.1
“The Slack Banker Dances:” Deposit Insurance and
Risk-Taking in the BankingCollapse ofthe 1920s
“If the deposits of most depositors are as safe in one bank as in another, by reason of the
government guaranty, a continually increasing proportion ofbank customers are going to keep
their deposits and do their banking business at those banks that are the most ‘liberal’ in their
loan policies. For it is to be remembered that the weak banks get the same insurance as the
strong ones, and, unlike the situation with other kinds ofinsurance, the bad risk pays no more
for its insurance than the good one. This means competition among banks in slackness in the
granting ofloans. The bank with the loose credit policy gets the business and the bank with
careful, cautious credit policy loses it. The slack banker dances and the conservative banker
pays the fiddler. If the conservative banker protests, the slack one invites him to go to a
warmer climate. Soon all are dapcing and the fiddler, if paid at all, must collect from the
depositors or from the taxpayers.”
The high number ofbank and savings and loan failures in the United States since 1980
has provoked considerable interest in the causes ofbanking instability. Many researchers have
blamed federal deposit insurance for encouraging banks and S&Ls to take excessive risks that
resulted in more failures and greater losses than would have occurred otherwise.2 Because
depositors are insured against loss (to the extent of insurance coverage), they have no incentive
to monitor their bank’s activities or to demand risk premia on deposit interest rates.
Consequently, a bank’s expected profit from investing in high-risk assets is greater than it
would be in the absence of deposit insurance. Risk-taking could be discouraged by charging
banksrisk-adjusted insurance premiums, but to date such a policy has not been implemented.3
The bank failures ofthe 1980s were startling, but not without precedent. Failures also
rose sharply during the 1920s, averaging 635 per year from 1921 to 1929. While there was
not federal insurance of bank deposits, eight states had insurance plans for their state-chartered
E. W. Kemmerer in an address to the Savings Bank Association of Massachusetts on September 14,
1933. [Association ofReserve City Bankers (1933, pp. 40-41)]
2 See O’Driscoll (1988), Kane (1989), and Kaufman (1989, pp. 208-209), for example.
~ Although federal deposit insurance has been in place since 1933, bank failures were not high until the
1980sbecause excessive risk-taking was discouraged by entry barriers that protected bank charter values.
What incentive remainedwas contained by regulations that limited competition among banks and S&Ls
for deposits. Over time, however, limits on entry have been relaxed and bank and S&L liabilities have
been deregulated. High and volatile interest rates and a sharp recession in the early 1980s pushed many
institutions toward insolvency, and thereby increased the incentive to take excessive risks. Deregulation
allowed them to attract funds by offering high deposit rates plus federal insurance. The decline in
agricultural, energy and real estate prices led to large loan defaults, bank and S&L insolvencies, and huge
losses for the insurance funds. See Kane (1989) and Keeley (1990).2
institutions.4 From 1910 to 1920 insured banks grew rapidly, but after the collapse of
commodity prices in 1920, loan defaults increased sharply and insured banks generally suffered
larger losses and had higher failure rates than did non-insured banks.5 This led Kemmerer and
other contemporaries to conclude that deposit insurance encouraged excessive risk-taking and
caused more bank failures than would haveoccurred otherwise.6
This paper takes a new look at the effects of deposit insurance during the 1920s.
Previous research has used state level data to infer a relationship between deposit insurance and
banking instability in this decade. While suggestive, most studies have not explored how
deposit insurance affected bank behavior, particularly within the regulatory environment of a
particular state. Here we use individual bank data from Kansas to study the impact of deposit
insurance on risk-taking. The experience ofKansas is useful because ofthe stresses placed on
the state banking system by the collapse of agricultural prices and increase in farm mortgage
defaults. Moreover, because membership in the state deposit insurance system was voluntary,
it is possible to compare the behavior of insured and non-insured banks facing similar
exogenous circumstances.
Between September 1920 and September 1926, 122 state chartered banks failed in
Kansas. Ofthose, 94 had been members of the insurance system (a 4.6% failure rate), and 28
had not (a 2.3% failure rate).7 By contrast, only six federally chartered banks failed (a 0.8%
failure rate).8 Two effects of insurance might have caused the comparatively poor
The states were Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and
~‘ashington.
Calomiris (1990) finds that state banks in insurance states grew more rapidly than state banks in non-
insurance states, after controlling for other aspects of bank structure, such as the extent of branch
banking, and changes in economic activity. Then, during the 1920s, insured banks suffered larger asset
declines than non-insured banks in other states. Alston, Grove and Wheelock (1991) find that the failure
rates of rural banks were higher in states that had insurance systems during the 1920s, again after
controlling for economic conditions and other variables suggested as causes ofbank failures.
6 See Cooke (1909, 1923), Robb (1921), Harger (1926), American Bankers Association (1933), and
Association ofReserve City Bankers (1933) for further evidence that contemporaries understood well the
~centives createdby deposit insurance.
We end our study in 1926 when, as discussed below, the withdrawalof most banks effectively ended
deposit insurance in Kansas.
8 National banks, trust companies, unincorporated banks, and state banks not meeting the various other
membership requirements were ineligible for insurance system membership.3
performance of insured banks. The Kansas system appears to have subsidized risk-taking,
creating a “moral hazard” since insurance premiums were low and imperfectly tied to failure
risk. Excessive risk-taking induced by insurance might thus have caused the higher failure rate
of insured banks. Alternatively, since risk-prone banks benefit most from insurance in terms
oflower deposit costs, the system may have merely sorted risk-prone from conservative banks.
Thus, “adverse selection” might explain the higher failure rate of insured banks -- the system
simply attracted banks that were more likely to fail in any event. Aprincipal goal of this paper
is to discern whether the Kansas system suffered from moral hazard, adverse selection, or
both.9
In a previous study (Wheelock and Kumbhakar (1991)), we introduced a model that
sought to explain simultaneously a bank’s risk-taking and its decision whether carry deposit
insurance. We estimated the model for 1910 to 1920, years when there were few failures and
the insurance system was growing, both in terms ofmembership and portion ofthe state’s bank
deposits. We found both that deposit insurance encouraged risk-taking and that the insurance
system attracted the most risk-prone banks.
Inthis paper we are interested in the behavior ofKansas banks whenfailures were high
and the insurance system was under stress, and so we estimate our model from 1922 to 1926.
A number of events, such as the failure of the state’s largest insured bank in 1923 and the
suspension of all insurance fund payments in 1925, likely affected perceptions about deposit
insurance. If depositors began to question the credibility of insurance, they may have begun to
monitor the use of their deposits, demand risk premia on deposit interest rates, and withdraw
their funds from banks taking unacceptable risks. This would have reduced the incentive and
We say that “adverse selection” was present if inherently risky banks were more likely to join the
insurance system. A strict definition, however, requires the presence of asymmetric information (see
Wilson (1989)). Since the risk measures that we observe, such as the capital/asset ratio, were available
to Kansas banking officials, a finding that the average riskiness of insured banks was higher than that of
non-insured banks is not necessarily evidence of adverse selection in the strict sense. Nevertheless, we
choose to conform with the term’s usage in the banking and deposit insurance literature (e.g., Calomiris
(1989)). For moral hazard to occur, information need not by asymmetric. Since limited liability insures
banks against extremely unfavorable outcomes, “moral hazard may not be resolved even where actions
can be costlessly observed cx post” (Kotowitz (1989, p. 210)).4
ability for insured banks to be riskier than non-insured banks, and we test whether these events
discouraged insured banks from holding less capital than non-insured banks.10
To study further the impact of deposit insurance, we attempt to predict the failure of
individual banks using balance sheet information on adate prior to failure. Mispriced deposit
insurance encourages banks to hold riskier assets and less capital than they would otherwise.
The experience of failed savings and loan institutions in the l980s suggests, moreover, that
capital and portfolio risk are interrelated. Kane (1989) shows that “zombie” S&Ls, i.e., those
that were insolvent but permitted by regulators to remain open, often adopted very high-risk
strategies in an attempt to recover solvency. Once equity has been wiped-out, shareholders
stand to benefit if a gamble should pay-off but incur no loss if it does not. In the absenceof
insurance, depositors would withdraw their funds, and thereby effectively close an insolvent
bank. But deposit insurance insulates depositors from risk, leaving the insurance fund or, as
with federal insurance today, the taxpayer to absorb any loss. We test whether insured Kansas
banks increased portfolio risk as their capital fell by including an interaction term of insurance
status and capital in our failure prediction model.1’
The Kansas Deposit Insurance System
Kansas was the second state to adopt an insurance system following the Panic of 1907.
An increase in bank failures and the adoption of insurance by Oklahoma in early 1908 were the
principal motivations. Robb (1921, pp. 107-12) notes that bankers located along the Oklahoma
border lobbied intensely for insurance, fearing competition from the Oklahoma banks that
eagerly advertised their insurance.
10 A notable difference between insurance today and the state systems of the 1920s is that the state
systems were not guaranteed by the state. In the event that the insurance fund was insufficient to
reimburse depositors, it was the depositors, not taxpayers, who lost. This difference is significant
because if depositors lose confidence in the system they will, in theory, demand risk premia on deposit
interest ratesthat erases the incentive for banks to take excessive risks.
The inclusion ofthis interaction term and hence the explicit testof moral hazard extends the model in
Wheelock (1992). That study found that insured banks had a greater probability of failure than non-
insured banks, holding constant other balance sheet information, but did not test directly whether risk-
taking increased as capital fell.5
Deposit insurance was made voluntary in Kansas in response to complaints that
insurance penalizes conservative banks by forcing them to protect depositors ofbanks that are
more likely to fail. State officials were well aware that deposit insurance could be attractive to
risk-prone institutions, and imposed a number of regulations to limit adverse selection. Banks
were required to havebeen in business for at least one year and undergo an examination before
being admitted to the insurance system. Insured banks were further required to maintain
capital ofat least 10 percent of total deposits,12 and surplus and undivided profits ofat least
10 percent of total capital. 13
To limit risk-taking by insured banks, the state imposed interest rate ceilings on
insured deposits and set insurance premiums that were inversely related to a bank’s capital to
deposit ratio. Premiums were initially set at 1/20th of 1% of a bank’s insured deposits less
capital and surplus. Because of the low assessment rate, however, the reward for holding extra
capital was small relative to its cost.14 If necessary to maintain the solvency of the insurance
fund, assessments could be increased to 1/4th of 1% of deposits. Banks were required to
deposit $500 of cash or eligible bonds with the state treasurer for each $100,000 of insured
deposits to guarantee assessment payment. Banks could withdraw from the insurance system
with six months notice; they remained liable, however, for assessments needed to reimburse
depositors of failed banks during that period. 15 Finally, the state bank commissioner had the
authority to suspend insurance for any bank found in violation of state regulations.16
In its early years the deposit insurance system was popular with both bankers and
depositors. From 1909 to 1920, the number of insured banks and the deposits in those banks
12 This regulation was repealed in 1917 [Warburton (1958a, p. 21)].
13 Total capital is the sum of the par value of the bank’s stock, the paid-in surplus, and undivided
?rofits.
A bank with $100,000 of eligible deposits, for example, would be charged $45 per year if it had
c~pital and surplus of$10,000, or $42.50 if it had $15,000 ofcapital and surplus.
1 See Cooke (1909) for a complete list of membership requirements and a comparison with those of
otherstates.
16 The reports of the bank commissioner do not state whether the insurance of any banks was
suspended, and so we have been unable to determine whether this threat was credible. Apparently at
least one bank lost its insurance, but Warburton (1958a, p. 15) reports that he found no other cases.6
grew faster than those of non-insured state and national banks. The state bank commissioner
reported in 1920 that
The Guaranty Law has successfully gone through the experimental stage ofits
existence, and to-day stands as a cornerstone in the great financial structure of
modern business.... It has grown in popularity among the people, and banks
operating under it seem to grow and prosper. [Kansas (1920, p. 5)]
The collapse of farm output prices in mid-1920, and the resulting increase in loan
defaults and bank failures soon changed perceptions about the deposit insurance system.
Special assessments were imposed on insured banks to reimburse depositors of failed
institutions, including a $1.4 million levy to reorganize the American State Bank ofWichita,
the state’s largest insured bank, which failed in 1923. After peaking at 65.6% of eligible
banks in that year, insurance system membership began to decline as banks withdrew to escape
the prospect ofstill more assessments.
Despite special insurance assessments in each year beginning in 1922, the insurance
fund proved inadequate to reimburse depositors of all failed banks. The liability created in
1919 by the second failure of an insured bank exceeded the balance ofthe insurance fund. By
1923 the fund owed $5 million more than its accumulated balance of $852,000 [Warburton
(1958a, p. 57)]. The deficit did not necessarily imply that the system was bankrupt, since
depositors were reimbursed only after the liquidation of a failed bank’s assets.’7 It should
have been apparent, however, that the fund would not be able to pay all depositors of failed
banks without higher assessments and a decline in failures.
Continued failures and inadequate revenue forced the state bank commissioner to
suspend the payment of insurance claims in March 1925. On April 10, 1926, the state
supreme court ruled that member banks could withdraw from the system simply by forfeiting
the bonds or cash they had deposited as a guarantee of assessment payment. The apparent
reduction in the cost ofwithdrawal led many banks to exit, and membership fell from 61.6%
of eligible banks in December 1925, to 42.2% in December 1926, and to 8.9% in December
17 Depositors of failed banks were issued interest bearing negotiable certificates that were redeemed as
failed bank assets were liquidated.7
1927 [FDIC (1956, p. 68)1. Although the fund was not closed until 1929, the supreme court
decision effectively ended the insuranceofbank deposits in Kansas.’8
Over the life ofthe insurance system, depositors ofjust 27 failed banks recovered the
entire amount of their insured deposits, while those of two other banks received 93% and 95%
of their deposits [Warburton (1958a, pp. 27-29)]. No insurance payments were made to
depositors of 88 member banks that failed [FDIC (1956, p. 58)1. On average, holders of
insured deposits received 53% of their funds from liquidationof bank assets and 18% from the
deposit insurance fund (including 7% from the reorganization of the American State Bank).
The remaining 29% ofinsured deposits were never recovered.
Was there a Decline in the Credibility of Insurance?
While depositors of many failed banks ultimately discovered that the insurance system
would not make them whole, ex ante they probably had faith in the system. The quick and
completereimbursement of depositors of the two insured banks that failed before 1920 likely
enhanced confidence in the system. At some point, however, it must have become apparent
that the deposit guaranty was “an experiment that failed” [Harger (1926)1. The system’s deficit
and the withdrawal ofmany banks led the bank commissioner to write in 1926 that “I can see
little to encourage one to believe that the guaranty fund will ever pay out, and it is my hope
that the next legislature will repeal the law...” [Kansas (1926, p. 4)]. Did the system lose
credibility before 1926? And, if so, did that affect the behavior of depositors and hence of
insured banks?
The sharp rise in bank failures after 1920, and the resulting increase in insurance fund
liabilities and delays in payment of claims probably led some depositors to question the
18 Before the court ruling fixed the cost of withdrawal, a withdrawing bank was held liable for
assessments needed to reimburse depositors of banks failing while the bank was a member of the
insurance system, which included a mandatory six months notice period. A withdrawing bank lost the
benefits of insurance, while saving only the amount of expected assessments needed to reimburse
depositors of banks that failed more than six months in the future. The potential saving might have been
large, but apparently before 1926 relatively few banks determined that it was large enough to warrant
withdrawal. Only one bank in our sample withdrew between 1924 and 1926, and none did between 1920
and 1924.8
promise of insurance and to shift their funds to banks that seemed less likely to fail. After
reaching 43.8% of the state’s bank deposits in 1921, insured banks then lost market share to
non-insured state and national banks [FDIC (1956, p. 68)]. The failure of the American State
Bank may have raised further doubts about the adequacy ofthe insurance fund, although Cooke
(1923, p. 124) reports that when the bank failed “comparatively few depositors even went
down to look in.” Since the bank’s reorganization protected depositors, the event might have
enhanced the system’s credibility. But further failures in 1923 “disturbed some depositors,”
according to Cooke (p. 124), and the suspension of all fund payments in 1925 undoubtedly
increased concerns about the system. The withdrawal of a majority of member banks
following the supreme court ruling in 1926 must have finally eliminated any faith in the system
that remained. 19
The comparatively high failure rate of insured Kansas banks suggests that the
regulations imposed to limit risk-taking were not entirely effective. Table 1 reports a
comparison of the capital adequacy of a sample of insured and non-insured state banks on
balance sheet reporting dates from 1920 to 1926.20 In each year the average capital/asset ratio
ofthe insured banks was significantly less than that ofthe non-insured banks (at the .05 level
orbetter). The difference in the ratios for insured and non-insured banks ranges from .0182 in
1920 to .0284 in 1926.21 A similar comparison for an alternative measure of capital
adequacy, the ratio of surplus and undivided profits to total loans and discounts
(surplus/loans), reveals further that insured banks maintained less capital than non-insured
19 We are currently examining newspaper accounts in order to gain further insight into contemporary
views ofthe system~s credibility.
20 Our random sample consists of approximately one-fourth the total number of state chartered banks
that were eligible for deposit insurance in 1914 and also operating in each year from 1910 to 1920. We
collected data for each bank from the Biennial Reports of the Kansas Commissioner ofBanking that were
publishedin even numbered years (except 1912 and 1916) from 1910 to 1926. Although each bank in
our sample was in business from 1910 to 1920, mergers and suspensions eliminated some banks
thereafter.
21 The differences in the otheryears for which we have data (1910, 1914, and 1918) also fall within this
range.9
banks.22 Since better capitalized banks can withstand a greater decline in asset value before
becoming insolvent, this suggests why the failure rate ofinsured banks was higher than that of
non-insured banks.
If depositors lost faith in the insurance system, the cost of deposits should have risen
for insured banks, implying that the average deposits to assets ratio of insured banks should
have fallen toward that of non-insured banks. Similarly, the capital/asset ratio of insured
banks should have risen toward that of non-insured banks. In fact, the differences in the
deposits/assets and capital/asset ratios ofinsured and non-insured banks peaked in 1926, as did
the average deposits/assets ratio of insured banks. If there was a decline in the credibility of
insurance before 1926, these data do not reveal it.
Simple comparison of capital/asset ratios for insured and non-insured banks does not
indicate whether deposit insurance encouraged insured banks to hold less capital, or merely
sorted inherently risk-prone from conservative banks.23 We attempt to separate the possible
moral hazard and adverse selection effects with following model:
= a1Y2* + + U
1 (1)
= a2Y1 + /32X2 + u2 (2)
where Y1 measures bank risk and ~
2
* measures a bank’s (unobserved) desire to belong to the
deposit insurance system. We replace ~
2
* with Y2, which is a dichotomous variable defined
as:
= 1 ifY2* > 0
= 0 otherwise.
In other words, a bank joins the insurance system only when its desire to do so exceeds a
certain threshold (which we normalize to zero). We measure risk with the capital/asset ratio,
22 We find that the surplus/loan ratio is a particularly useful predictor of bank failure: the lower the
ratio, the more likely a bank was to fail. The difference in this ratio between insured and non-insured
banks is statistically significant only in 1920.
23 In Wheelock and Kumbhakar (1991) we attempted to predict insurance system membership in 1910
using balance sheet information from 1908, the year before insurance was begun. We found that risk-
prone banks were more likely to join the system in that the lower a bank’s capital/asset ratio in 1908 the
higher theprobability that it would have deposit insurance in 1910.10
and hence the higher is this ratio, the lower is risk. Thus a2 will be negative if adverse
selection is present. Similarly, if deposit insurance leads a bank to increase risk, then a1 will
be negative. X1 and X2 represent exogenous variables we believe might have affected bank
risk and the desire to carry deposit insurance.
We estimate (1) and (2) using a two-stage procedure. First we estimate the reduced
.4 4




we estimate (1) using OLS, replacing ~
2
* with Y2 and estimate (2) with maximum likelihood
A 24
probit, replacing Y1 with Y1.
In addition to deposit insurance system membership, we include a number ofvariables
as regressors in the capital/asset equation to explain bank risk. Banks in regions severely
affected by economic distress would likely have suffered loan losses that reduced their
capital/asset ratios regardless of whether or not they carried deposit insurance. Alston, Grove
and Wheelock (1991) find that states with comparatively rapid increases in agricultural land
value or improved acreage during World War I suffered the worst agricultural distress and had
the highest bank failure rates following the collapse of commodity prices in 1920. Thus we
include the percent change in county land value (i~Landvalue),improved acreage (Ldmpacre),
and the percent change in county population (i~Pop)from 1910 to 1920 to control for the
effects of economic activity on capital/asset ratios.25 We use an alternative measure of
economic conditions, the percent change in county farm land and building value (L~LBval)from
1920 to 1925 in one specification.
Another possible source ofvariation in bank capital/asset ratios stems from competitive
forces brought about by transportation improvements in rural areas. After 1910 many farmers
purchased an automobile or truck for the first time and rural roads were markedly improved.
The impact ofthese improvements should have been most dramatic in rural areas where there
were relatively many banks serving geographically isolated markets. Because branching was
24 For a complete discussion ofour model and estimator seeWheelock and Kumbhakar (1991).
25 Changes in improved acreage tended to be highest in western counties since most of eastern Kansas
was already cultivated by 1910, while changes in land value per acre were greatest in eastern Kansas.11
not permitted, rural counties with low population densities typically had the highest numbers of
banks per person. We thus include the ratio oftotal banks to county population (Bankpop) and
the percent rural of county population (Rural) as regressors.26 Finally we include bank age
(Age) to capture any intangibles, such as management skill, that may be correlated with age
and affected a bank’s capital/asset ratio.27
Bank age may also have affected a bank’sdecision to join the deposit insurance system.
Wheelock and Kumbhakar (1991) find that older banks were less likely to become members at
the system’s inception, perhaps becausethey already enjoyed a lower costofdeposits than their
newer competitors. We expect that a bank’s decision to join the system was also influenced by
the actions of its closest competitors. In order to compete successfully for deposits, a bank
might have been more likely to join the insurance system if most of its competitors were also
members, regardless of its own preferences for risk. Banks in counties with few members
might havefelt less competitive pressure to join themselves. We therefore include the ratio of
insured to total banks in a bank’s county (Dlratio) as a regressor. We also include the ratio of
total banks to county population (Bankpop). Counties with the highest numbers of banks per
capita probably experienced the greatest increases in competition from rural transportation
improvements. Banks in these counties might have been more likely to join the deposit
insurance system in effort to compete successfully in the new environment.
Table 2 reports second-stage estimates of the capital/asset model, and Table 3 reports
estimates ofthe insurance system membership model. Equation 2.1 is an estimate for 1910 to
1920, taken from Wheelock and Kumbhakar (1991), for comparison. In these years we find
evidence that insurance system membership encouraged risk-taking. The coefficient estimate
oni~tindicates that insurance system membership caused a bank’s capital/asset ratio to decline
26 See Aiston, Grove and Wheelock (1991) for references and analysis of the consequences of this
technological change on bank failures.
27 We also include regional and year dummy variables. A full description of our data and sources is
presented in the appendix.12
by .0077, which is approximately 40% of the average difference in this ratio between insured
and non-insured banks from 1910 to 1920.
Equation 2.2 is the same specification estimated for 1922 to 1926. Again it appears
that deposit insurance encouraged member banks to hold less capital than non-insured banks.
The difference in the capital/asset ratios of insured and non-insured banks averaged .024 in
A
these years, and thus the coefficient estimate on DI indicates that 50% ofthe difference can be
explained by risk-taking caused by deposit insurance. We find also that the older a bank, the
lower its capital/asset ratio. Finally, we note an apparent correlation between local economic
activity from 1910 to 1920 and bank capital during the early 1920s. Banks in counties where
population or land value increased most from 1910 to 1920 had systematically lower capital
ratios during the 1920s, while those in counties where improved farm acreage increased most
had higher capital ratios. Land value tended to increase most in eastern counties, where
agricultural distress was most severe during the 1920s, while improved acreage rose the most
in western counties from 1910 to 1920. Banks in counties where the change in farm land and
building value from 1920 to 1925 was highest had lower capital/asset ratios (Equation 3.3).28
Equations 2.4 and 2.5 test whether the impact of deposit insurance on risk-taking
changed over time. In Equation 2.4, we test for a break after 1922. The coefficient on D~11
A
measures the impact ofinsurance in 1922, while that on D12 measures the impact in 1924 and
1926. In Equation 2.5, we test for a break after 1924, letting the coefficient on DI1 measure
the impact in 1922 and 1924, and that on D12 measure the impact in 1926. The point estimates
indicate no decline in the effect ofinsurance system membership on bank risk. Ifanything, the
impact appears greatest in 1926. As with the simple comparison of capital/asset ratios for
insured and non-insured banks in Table 1, the model estimates in Table 2 suggest that insured
banks continued to exploit deposit insurance through 1926.
During the first ten years of deposit insurance in Kansas, the system apparently
A
attracted the most risk-prone banks. The coefficient on the capital/asset ratio (CIA) in
28 None of the coefficients on the regional or year dummies is statistically significant.13
Equation 3.1 indicates that the lower a bank’s ratio, the greater the likelihood that it would
choose to belong to the insurance system. A bank’s membership decisionalso appears to have
been affected by the membership of its competitors: a bank was more likely to join the system
if many ofits local competitors were also members.
Duringthe 1920s, a bank’s membership decision again reflected the membership status
ofother local banks. We do not find, however, that the probability ofmembership was higher
the lower a bank’s capital/asset ratio in these years. Our results suggest that before 1920,
deposit insurance attracted risk-prone banks and encouraged greater risk-taking. After 1920,
we find that deposit insurance continued to encourage banks to hold less capital, but detect no
evidence that the system attracted banks that were inherently more risk-prone.29
Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure
Insured banks had a higher failure rate than their non-insured competitors, and our
empirical results indicate that deposit insurance encouraged banks to hold less capital than they
would otherwise. In this section, we examine further the relationship between insurance and
bank failure by attempting to determine the characteristics that made some banks more likely to
fail than others. For each state bank that failed between September 1920 and September 1926,
we obtained its most recently published balance sheet prior to failure.3° Since balance sheets
were published biennially (in August), the length oftime between the balance sheet and failure
dates could extend from one month to two years. We also collected data for similarly sized
random samples of non-failing banks in the same biennial intervals.3’W e use these data to
29 Since our sample consists only ofbanks that operated since 1910, it omits any that were organized
because of the presence of deposit insurance. This might bias our results against finding adverse
selection.
30 Here failure refers to any bank whose operation was suspended or halted by state regulators due to
insolvency. It excludes banks that liquidated voluntarily. We also estimated our model with data from
the second to most recent balance sheet before failure. As might be expected, these data are less useful
for predicting failure, although we found no substantive differences with the estimates using data closer
to failure date. These results are available upon request.
31 We omitted any bank that had been chartered within the previous eighteen months because of the
provision that banks chartered for less than one year were ineligible fordeposit insurance.14
estimate a probit model in which the dependent variable is set equal to 1 if the bank failed
within two years ofits most recent balance sheet date and to 0 if it did not.
The incentives for risk-taking created by deposit insurance are well known and derived
theoretically by Merton (1977) andby Kareken and Wallace (1978). If insurance premiums do
not increase with the level ofbank risk, then bankshave an incentive to assume more risk than
they would in the absence of insurance. In Merton’s model, insurance encourages a bank to
hold riskier assets and a lower capital/asset ratio thanit would otherwise.
Our finding that insured Kansas bankshad lower capital/asset and surplus/loan ratios is
consistent with Merton’s model. The balance sheet data available for Kansas banks do not,
however, reveal the quality of bank assets. We therefore include deposit insurance as a
separate regressor in our failure prediction model to test whether it had an impact on failures
apart from a possible influence on observed financial ratios. The insurance variable is a
dummy, 1 if the bank was insured, 0 if not. We expect that the coefficient will be positive,
i.e., that insurance increased the likelihood offailure.
It is important to note, however, that the effect of deposit insurance should depend on
bank solvency. That is, the less capital that bank shareholders have at stake, the greater the
incentive to gamble with bank assets. In the case where equity is entirely wiped-out, but
deposit insurance and regulatory forbearance permit a bank to remain open, shareholders have
an incentive to take extreme risks. Kane (1989) cites the failure to close insolvent institutions
as the main reason why losses to the deposit insurance system grew explosively during the
1980s. Warburton (1958a, p. 19) reports that in Kansas, “Banks found to be insolvent or in
financial difficulties were nursed along by the [banking] department instead ofbeing closed.”
He gives no indication of when this policy was in effect, how many insolvent banks were
permitted to remain open, or how banks responded to forbearance. He implies, however, that
the policy was unsuccessful.32 Even if bank capital is not completely eroded, there is an
32 At least two other states experimented with forbearance--Nebraska and Texas. There is no indication
ofhow many insolvent banks regained positive net worth, but in both states therewere many subsequent
closures ofbanks that had been insolvent for some time. See Calomiris (1989) and Warburton (1958b).15
incentive to increase portfolio risk as net worth declines.33 We test for this effect by
interacting deposit insurance membership with the capital ratios in our failure prediction
model, and expect that a decline in net worth increased the probability of failure more for
insured banks than for non-insured banks.
We include a number of financial ratios, suggested by White (1984), as independent
variables. The capital/asset and surplus/loans ratios are included since, for a given asset
portfolio, the less a bank’s capital, the lower its protection against failure: “If there is a
significant difference in one ofthese ratios between failing and non-failing banks, it indicates
that closure occurred in part because the banks had either suffered from defaults on their
earning assets or invested insufficiently in capital given the risks embodied in their loan
portfolio” (White, p. 123).
Loans tend to be the most risky assets that banks hold. It is likely, moreover, that the
loans ofrural unit banks in the 1920s were not well diversified. We therefore expect that the
higher the ratio ofloans and discounts to total assets (loans/assets), the greater the probability
of bank failure. On the other hand, if a bank invested a large portion of its assets in high
quality bonds it may have had less chance of failure. We include the ratio of total bonds to
total assets (bonds/assets) as a regressor, but because the average quality of the bonds that
Kansas banks held is not known, the sign ofthis variable’s coefficient cannot be predicted.
Reserves provide banks with funds to accommodate deposit withdrawals. The higher
the ratio of cash and exchange to total deposits (cash/deposits), the better able is a bank to
satisfy these demands, and hence the coefficient of this variable should be negative. The
primary source of funds for a bank are deposits. In the face of heavy deposit withdrawals or
loan defaults, however, a bank may be unable to attract sufficient deposits to remain liquid,
and therefore must resort to alternative sources of funds. A high ratio of short-term
borrowings (bills payable and other liabilities) to total assets (bills pay./assets), suggests that a
bank’s condition is precarious and the greater the likelihood of its failure. On the other hand,
See Furlong and Keeley (1989) and Keeley (1990).16
we expect that the higher the ratio of total deposits to total assets (deposits/assets), the lower
will be the probability ofbank failure.
Bank size, as measured by the log of total assets (ln assets), and the number of years
the bank had been chartered (Age) are included as additional independent variables. The
majority ofbanks failing during the 1920s were small, rural unit banks. While the principal
determinant of failure seems to have been the agricultural depression, other forces tended to
enhance the fortunes of large banks relative to small banks. Reduced transportation costs
brought about by improved roads and increased use ofmotor vehicles by farmers, for example,
made it easier for rural residents to bank further from home and possibly take advantage of
better terms offered by larger banks in bigger towns.34 We therefore expect that larger banks
were less likely to fail. We include bank age to capture such intangibles as management
quality and goodwill, which may have made a bank less likely to fail. The coefficient on this
variable should be negative.
Equations 4.1 and 4.2 in Table 4 are model estimates based on the entire data set.
Equations 4.3 and 4.4 include only those banks that failed within twelve months of their
balance sheet date, while Equation 4.5 includes only those failing between 13 and 24 months
aftertheir statement date.35 Each regression indicates that the lower a bank’s surplus to loans
ratio, the higher was its probability of failure.36 Banks with low capital were less able to
withstand declining asset values. Our results suggest also that banks with large bond portfolios
tended to have a lower chance of failure, as did those with high reserve ratios. Banks that
relied heavily on bills payable and other short-term borrowings for funds tended to have a
higher failure probability. There is some indication that the older a bank, the less likely it was
Numerous studies have found evidence of economies of scale in banking, and there is evidence that
city banks were able to offer customers better terms than could rural banks during the 1920s. Several
contemporaries and historians have linked improvements in transportation to rural bank failures during
the 1920s. See Alston, Grove and Wheelock (1991).
To save space, we do not report the analogue of Equations 4.1 and 4.3 for banks failing more than
twelve months after their balance sheet date.
36 In general, this ratio was more useful for predicting failure than was the capital/asset ratio, probably
because the capital/asset ratio is highly correlated with other ratios. White (1984) also found this
dichotomy.17
to fail, but there is no apparent relationship between bank size and failure after controlling for
other effects.37
In addition to the financial ratios, deposit insurance membership is a useful predictor of
failure. Its inclusion adds statistically significant explanatory power to the model.38
Evaluated at the mean ofthe data, deposit insurance membership increases the probability of
failure by 16%. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that insured banks held riskier
portfolios, which increased their probability of failure.
A lesson of the S&L crisis of the 1980s is that risk-taking increases as a bank
approaches insolvency. We expect, therefore, that insurance system membership will be
especially useful for distinguishing banks near failure from non-failing banks. When banks
failing more than 12 months after their balance sheet date are omitted, the coefficient on
deposit insurance is nearly twice as large as when all data are used (compare Equations 4.3 and
4.1). The inclusion of deposit insurance also adds statistically significant explanatory power
(at the .01 level).39 At the mean values, insurance system membership increases the
probability offailure by 18%.
To test further whether risk-taking increased as net worth declined, we include an
interaction of deposit insurance status and the surplus/loan ratio ((DI)(S/L)). Doing so does
not add statistically significant explanatory power, but the negative coefficient on this term is
consistent with the hypothesis that insured banks became riskier, and hence more likely to fail,
as their capital fell.4°
~ Surprisingly, the results seem to indicate that the higher a bank’s loan to asset ratio or the lower its
deposit to asset ratio, the less its chance of failure. These results are likely due to multicollinearity,
however, as loans/assets is correlated with cash/deposits (correlation coefficient of —0.79) and
deposits/assets is correlated with bills pay./assets (correlation coefficient of —0.86). When cash/deposits
and bills pay./assets are omitted, the coefficients on loans/assets and deposits/assets have the anticipated
3#~Alikelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis that the inclusion of deposit insurance as a regressor
adds no explanatory power can be rejected at the .10 level. The test statistic is 3.604, while the critical
chi-square value is 2.706.
The test statistic equals 6.366, while the critical chi-square value is 6.635.
40 As might be expected, the interaction term is highly correlated with its two components. Its
correlation coefficient with deposit insurance membership is 0.64 and with surplus/loans is 0.61.18
Conclusion
Researchers conclude that the present system of federal deposit insurance encourages
excessive risk-taking that, coupled with partial deregulation, led to more bank and S&L
failures during the 1980s than would have occurred otherwise. Contemporaries saw a similar
phenomenon during the 1920s, and noted that deposit insurance permitted risk-prone banks to
flourish. This paper contributes further evidence that deposit insurance encouraged excessive
risk-taking during the 1920s by comparing the performance of insured and non-insured banks
facing similar economic and regulatory conditions.
Economic theory predicts that a bank with deposit insurance will hold riskier assets
and less capital than it would in the absence of insurance. We find that insurance encouraged
Kansas banks to hold lower capital/asset ratios than non-insured banks. We also find that,
holding capital constant, deposit insurance increased the probability that a bank would
ultimately fail. And we find, moreover, that for a given decline in net worth, the probability
of failure rose more for an insured bank than for a non-insured bank. Thus our evidence
suggests that insured banks had riskier portfolios than non-insured banks, and that portfolio
risk rose as net worth fell.
Like other state deposit insurance systems, the Kansas insurance fund was not
guaranteed by the state. If the fund had insufficient assets to reimburse depositors of failed
banks, then depositors, not taxpayers, suffered. Thus, if depositors began to question the
solvency of the insurance system, they would have had an incentive to monitor bank risk,
demand risk premia on deposit interest rates, and withdraw funds from banks taking
unacceptably high risks. Once all credibility was gone, insured banks should have faced the
same deposit supply curve as non-insured banks, and the incentive to take excess risk should
have disappeared. We find, however, no evidence that the incentive for insured banks to hold
less capital diminished over time in Kansas, despite increasing deficits in the state insurance
fundand delays (and ultimately, suspension) in the paymentofinsurance claims.TABLE 1
A Comparison of Insured and Non-insured Banks
1920
C/A S/L D/A obs.
Insured .1314* .0808* .8379* 143
Non-insured .1496 .0951 .8166 69
1922
C/A S/L D/A obs.
Insured .1576* .0941 .7896 140
Non-insured .1809 .1047 .7700 62
1924
C/A S/L D/A obs.
Insured .1583* .1013 .8138 134
Non-insured .1793 .1154 .7965 55
1926
C/A S/L D/A obs.
Insured .1469* .0959 .8408* 122
Non-insured .1753 .1067 .8039 55
C/A is the capital/asset ratio; S/L is the surplus/loans ratio; D/A is the deposits/assets ratio.
* the hypothesis that the difference in the ratio for insured banks and for non-insured banks
equals zero can be rejected (at the .05 level or better).TABLE 2
A Test for Moral Hazard
Dependent Variable: Capital/Assetsa
Variable 2.1 2~2 23 2A
Intercept 9.52 16.55 15.95 16.13 16.28
(6.87)*** (11.03)*** (l2.59)*** (10.48)*** (10.53)***
A










Age —0.01 —0.07 —0.06 —0.07 —0.07
(0.34) (2.32)** (2.01)** (2.29)** (2.27)**
Bankpop 0.46 1.50 1.15 1.46 1.49
(0.42) (1.40) (1.12) (1.36) (1.39)
Rural 3.19 —0.78 0.23 —0.75 —0.75
(2.71)*** (0.65) (0.19) (0.62) (0.62)
L~.Pop 0.01 —0.04 —0.04 —0.04
(0.67) (2.89)*** (2.91)*** (2.90)***
t~Impacre —0.00 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.27) (2.68)*** (2.66)*** (2.70)***
E~.Landvalue 0.03 —0.05 —0.05 —0.05
(1.86)* (2.70)*** (2.72)*** (2.68)***
t,~LBval —0.04
(1.56)*
log like. 1183.82 880.18 871.85 880.58 880.50
obs. 820 568 568 568 568
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses; ~ **, and * indicate statistically significant atthe .01,
.05, and .10 levels (two-tail tests).
a the coefficients in each regression have been multiplied by 100.
b c Dli reflects the impact ofinsurance status before 1924 (Equation 2.4)or before 1926
(Equation 2.5), and D12 reflects it thereafter.
Each regression also included four regional dummies and dummies for each balance sheet year.TABLE 3
A Test for Adverse Selection














log like. —377.45 —253.89
obs. 820 568
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses; ~ **, and * indicate statistically significant at the .01,
.05, and . 10 levels (one-tail tests).
a b Equation 3.1 uses data from 1910-20 and Equation 3.2 uses data from 1922-26.TABLE 4
Kansas Bank Failures: Probit Model Estimates
Variable 4la 42a 43b 4~b
Intercept 4.59 4.50 2.11 1.34 4.81
(1.98)* (1.93)* (0.70) (0.43) (1.77)*
Surplus/ —6.19 —1.77 —6.14 —0.95 —1.53
Loans (2.39)*** (0.45) (1.51)* (0.16) (0.35)
Bonds/ —7.04 —6.82 —6.21 —5.63 —8.42
Assets (2.46)*** (2.33)** (1.77)* (i.54)* (2.29)**
Loans/ ‘ -6.60 -6.46 -8.23 -7.66 —6.00
Assets (3.27) (3.15) (3.20) (2.87) (2.56)
Cash/ —7.80 —7.67 —9.86 —9.10 —6.74
Deposits (4.04)*** (3.90)*** (3.68)*** (3.28)*** (3.08)***
Deposits/ 1.84 1.52 6.38 6.08 0.08
Assets (0.85) (0.70) (1.88) (1.79) (0.03)
Bills Pay./ 5.67 5.41 11.46 11.31 3.69
Assets (2.43)*** (2.31)** (3.02)*** (2.97)*** (1.45)*
Insurance 0.39 0.88 0.76 1.29 0.93
(i.89)** (2.26)** (2.41)*** (2.39)*** (2.03)**
(DI)(S/L) —6.79 —8.70 —7.15
(1.49)* (1.21) (1.39)*
Age —0.01 —0.01 —0.02 —0.02 —0.001
(0.57) (0.66) (1.39)* (1.35)* (0.06)
in Assets 0.04 0.04 —0.001 0.01 0.04
(0.29) (0.24) (0.01) (0.03) (0.22)
R2 .25 .26 .36 .37 .19
Log Like. —130.70 —129.60 —66.21 —65.48 —106.10
%Fail Correct 70.0 68.3 52.1 56.3 52.8
Observations 240 240 168 168 192
Failures 120 120 48 48 72
Notes: t-statistics are in parenthe~,es; ~~ , * indicate statistically significant atthe .01, .05,
and .10 levels (one-tail tests); a c Equations 4.1 and 4.2 include all failed banks, Equations
4.3 and 4.4 include only those failing within twelve months oftheir balance sheet date, and
Equation 4.5 includes only those failing between 13 and 24 months oftheir balance sheet date.References
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